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LANDLORD PROTECTION LAW REVISITED: THE AMENDMENTS 
TO THE ARKANSAS RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT OF 
2007, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-101 ET SEQ.
Marshall Prettyman*
In the 2008 Arkansas Law Notes, I wrote in an article on the Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 (“Act”) that the Act would better be titled 
the “Landlord Protection Act.”1 The article pointed out that the Arkansas 
Act essentially followed the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 
(“Uniform Act”) drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws except that it removed every provision of the Uniform 
Act favorable to tenants, hence the title “Landlord Protection Act.”2 The 
Arkansas Act also engrafted on the Uniform Act a new remedy for eviction 
that was to be cognizable in the district courts and had a simpler, more-pro-
se-friendly procedure. In the 2009 Legislative session there were a number 
of changes made to the Act. It would appear that this was in part in response 
to the concerns raised in the article. This article will first review the changes 
made to the Act and then address what is perhaps more important, the 
changes that were not made.
I. 2009 AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
The first area addressed by the Legislature was the service provisions 
of the Act. This was to be expected because the provisions as drafted con-
tained one obvious error. As originally written the Act provided in section 
18-17-903(a) of the Arkansas Code3 that service may be in the manner pro-
vided by law for service of a summons in circuit court. Obviously, no prob-
lems were created there. However, the Act went on to provide in 18-17-
903(b)(1) that service could be made by affixing notice to the most conspic-
uous part of the premises.4 Sections 18-17-903(b)(2)(A)–(B) of the Arkansas 
* Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law and Director of Litigation 
for Legal Aid of Arkansas. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of 
Charles Kester, Esq., to the section on investigation of criminal activity by a landlord. Mr. 
Kester is a highly experienced criminal attorney.
1. Marshall Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 et 
Seq. 2008 ARK. L. NOTES 71, 71.
2. Id.
3. Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, § 1, 2007 Ark. Acts 
5110, 5127 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(a) (Supp. 2007)).
4. §1, 2007 Ark. Acts at 5127 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b)(1) (Supp. 
2007)).
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Code were apparently meant to delineate the circumstances under which 
service could be made by affixing notice to the premises.5
In a blatant drafting error, instead of saying if service could not be 
made pursuant to section (a) (standard civil service), the Act stated when 
service could not be made under section (b)(1) (affixing to the premises). 
The nonsensical result was the Act authorized tacking under certain circum-
stances when you were already unable to serve the notice by tacking.
In the 2009 amendments to the Act, the Legislature simply eliminated 
sections 18-17-903(b)(2)(A)–(B) of the Arkansas Code.6 Section 18-17-
903(b) now reads: “When service in accordance with subsection (a) of this 
section has been unsuccessfully attempted and no person is found in posses-
sion of the premises, the copy of the order to vacate may be served by leav-
ing it affixed to the most conspicuous part of the premises.”7 This amend-
ment to the Act raises two distinct problems.
The first problem with the service amendment is one of interpretation. 
What is unsuccessful service? Under the language deleted, if there was one 
unsuccessful attempt to serve the notice, it could be tacked. However, sher-
iffs' officers and process servers rarely return notice as undeliverable after 
only one attempt at service. Is service under subsection (a) only unsuccess-
ful after the sheriff or process server has made his or her usual efforts to 
effect service or if he or she goes out once and no one is home? Similarly, 
what is meant by “no person is found in possession?” Is it simply that no 
one is present at the time of attempted service even though all of the tenant’s 
belongings are in the premises and it clearly appears lived in, or does it have 
to appear that no one is still living at the premises? After all, many people 
are not physically in their homes from nine to five but are definitely still 
living there; this is the primary reason process servers make several attempts 
at service during various times of the day. 
The second problem with the service amendment is whether service by 
affixing the notice to the premises is sufficient under the due process clauses 
of the United States8 and Arkansas Constitutions.9 Actual notice is the es-
sence of due process. In the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
5. See §1, 2007 Ark. Acts at 5127 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b)(2)(A)–
(B) (Supp. 2007)).
6. See Act of Mar. 6, 2009, No. 311, § 5, 2009 Ark. Acts 1251, 1256 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b) (Supp. 2011)).
7. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b) (Supp. 2011).
8. See Smith v. Edwards, 279 Ark. 79, 83, 648 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1983) (citing Davis v. 
Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 1207, 482 S.W.2d 785, 788 (1972)).
9. See Patsy Simmons Ltd. P'ship v. Finch, 2010 Ark. 451, at 4–5, 370 S.W.3d 257, 
260 (citing Trusclair v. McGowan Working Partners, 2009 Ark. 203, at 4, 306 S.W.3d 428, 
430; Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701, 709, 120 S.W.3d 
525, 530 (2003); Carruth v. Design Interiors, Inc., 324 Ark. 373, 374–75, 921 S.W.2d 944, 
945 (1996)).
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Trust10 the United States Supreme Court found sufficient notice under due 
process must be by the means most likely to apprise the parties of the ac-
tion.11
In keeping with the constitutional requirements, the Arkansas Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide that if the whereabouts of a defendant are known, 
service must be personally on the defendant, a member of his household 
over the age of fourteen, or a person authorized by appointment or law to 
receive service or by a writing where the defendant acknowledges receipt, 
such as certified mail or an acknowledgment of service.12 Affixing notice on 
the premises provides no such assurance. A posted notice is subject to being 
blown away, washed away, or torn off by a curious passerby. As originally 
drafted, the Act required that notice also be mailed if service was by affixing 
to the premises.13 That requirement was deleted in the amendments,14 which 
made the present provision for tacking less likely to apprise the defendant of 
the action, and therefore, that much more likely to be constitutionally infirm.
There are situations where affixing the notice to the premises, especial-
ly with the added requirement of a mailing, would be appropriate and consti-
tutionally sound. Arkansas law recognizes that, where after diligent inquiry 
the defendant cannot be found, some form of constructive service is ac-
ceptable.15 There will be cases where good faith attempts at personal service 
will fail; and there will be a legitimate question as to whether the defendant 
remains in the premises.  
In those cases, affixing notice to the premises, especially if coupled 
with mailing, is the means most likely to apprise the defendant of the action. 
Indeed, it is more likely to notify a defendant than a warning order pub-
lished in a paper or posted at the courthouse would be. However, there 
would seem to be no reason that, as in the case of the warning order, the 
affixing to the premises should not also include a mailing to the last known 
address, which is most likely that of the premises. The cost of a first-class 
stamp is hardly an inordinate burden to put on the plaintiff.
10. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
11. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citing 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); 
Priest v. Bd. of Trs. of Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604, 614–15 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 
398, 409 (1900)).
12. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added) (repealed 
2009) read, “When service as provided in subdivision (b)(1) of this section has been attempt-
ed unsuccessfully, a copy of the order may be served by affixing it to the most conspicuous 
part of the premises and mailing a copy of the notice.”
14. See Act of Mar. 6, 2009, No. 311, § 5, 2009 Ark. Acts 1251, 1256 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-17-903(b) (Supp. 2011)).
15. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(f).
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In the case of Gorman v. Ratliff,16 the Arkansas Supreme Court found 
self-help evictions by the landlord were illegal and any provision in a lease 
authorizing self-help eviction would be invalid.17 In a case where the tenant 
abandons the premises without notice to the landlord, personal service will 
often not be feasible.  However, if the landlord merely changes the locks, he 
or she runs the risk of engaging in a self-help eviction.   Since the remedy 
sought is possession of the premises, affixing notice to the premises along 
with a mailing to the last known residence, namely the premises in question, 
seems to be the means that is not only most likely to notify a tenant not 
available for personal service but also singularly appropriate to the remedy 
requested.
The Act as originally written created a new remedy for eviction with 
jurisdiction in the district court rather than circuit court. 18 The new eviction-
remedy had a simplified procedure wherein the landlord was to file an affi-
davit with the court and the court would issue an order to the tenant to va-
cate the premises or appear within ten days and show cause why the tenant 
should not be evicted.19 If the tenant failed to appear, a writ of eviction 
would issue. 
The Act specifically stated that the district court along with the circuit 
court would have jurisdiction to hear the action.20 As the 2008 article point-
ed out, there was a serious problem with the Legislature granting jurisdic-
tion to the district court. Amendment 80 of the Arkansas Constitution gives 
the supreme court, not the Legislature, the power to determine the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts and what matters may be heard in district court. 
The supreme court has exercised that power through Administrative Rule 
18. The supreme court’s grant of jurisdiction to the district courts does not 
include evictions, either under the Act or under the unlawful detainer act,21
which had for years been the civil remedy for eviction. Actions under the 
detainer statute had always been limited to circuit court.22
At the time of the 2009 amendments to the Act, this author and others 
had successfully argued in a number of district courts that the court lacked 
jurisdiction for the reasons stated above. Additionally, the Benton County 
16. 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888, (1986).
17. See id. at 337–38, 712 S.W.2d at 890–91.
18. Section 18-17-701(c)(1) of the Arkansas Code as originally written provided an 
action under the Act could be commenced in district or circuit court. See Arkansas Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, § 1, 2007 Ark. Acts 5110, 5127 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-701(c)(1) (Supp. 2007)).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-902(b) (Supp. 2007).
20. See Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, § 1, 2007 Ark. 
Acts 5110, 5113 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-203 (Supp. 2007)).
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-60-301 to -312 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2011).
22. See Act of Mar. 28, 2007, No. 535, § 1, 2007 Ark. Acts 2734, 2735 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-60-306 (Supp. 2011).
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district judges decided they lacked jurisdiction after one of them had read 
the 2008 article and brought it to the attention of his colleagues. The 
amendments appear to also recognize the problem as the language was 
changed from an outright grant of jurisdiction to the district court to provide 
the action could be brought in a “district court having jurisdiction over the 
eviction proceeding.”23 The amended language appears to be a clear recogni-
tion that until the supreme court should choose to grant such jurisdiction, it 
does not exist.
To date the supreme court has made no such grant of jurisdiction, and 
the change it has made to district court jurisdiction would seem to indicate it 
is not inclined to do so. As was stated earlier, the remedy of eviction con-
tained in the Act is in addition to the long-standing civil remedy for evic-
tion, the forcible entry and detainer statute.  The detainer statute provides for 
a landlord to bring an eviction proceeding in circuit court.24 The action is 
served on the tenant, who has to file an objection within five working days 
or a writ of possession will issue and the tenant will be locked out by a sher-
iff’s officer.25
If the tenant files an objection, the matter will be scheduled for a hear-
ing on possession.26 Possession hearings are scheduled in an expedited 
manner, often within ten days to two weeks. The landlord must show a pri-
ma facie case for possession, and the tenant may present evidence rebutting 
that prima facie case.27 If the landlord prevails, a writ of possession will 
issue on the landlord posting a bond unless the tenant within five days posts 
a bond of his own.28 Needless to say, a tenant who cannot pay the rent will 
not be able to post a bond. As such, the bond requirement only comes into 
play in cases that are other than for non-payment of rent. The case will be 
scheduled for final hearing at a later date, after the opportunity for both par-
ties to fully plead the case and engage in discovery and other pretrial mat-
ters. The final hearing can be tried to a jury if requested by either party, the 
possession hearing being solely to the judge.29
The supreme court has, in recent years, been exploring the possibility 
of extending district court jurisdiction. To that end, the court has designated 
certain district courts as pilot courts and granted them extended jurisdiction 
under Administrative Rule 18. One of the additional grants of jurisdiction is 
for the pilot courts to be empowered to hear forcible entry and detainer and 
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-901(a) (Supp. 2011).
24. See id. § 18-60-306.
25. See id. § 18-60-307(b) (Supp. 2011).
26. See id. § 18-60-307(c)(1).
27. See id. § 18-60-307(d)(1)(A).
28. See id. § 18-60-307(d)–(e).
29. The right to a trial by jury in civil cases is constitutionally mandated in article 2, 
section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution.
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unlawful detainer actions if referred by a circuit court.30 Significantly, there 
was no similar grant to the pilot courts or to any district court to hear the 
additional eviction remedy provided by the Act. 
It now appears well settled that the district courts have no jurisdiction 
over the remedy provided for in the Act. This takes on much greater import 
in light of another of the Act’s amendments; all references to initiating the 
remedy in circuit court were deleted. Without the option of bringing the 
Act’s eviction proceeding in circuit court, the remedy was cast into limbo. It 
is on the books, but no court has jurisdiction to hear the remedy’s actions.  
The only apparent reason for removing the circuit courts’ jurisdiction 
stems from another provision of the Act. Under the Act the eviction reme-
dy’s filing fee was $25.00, which coincided with the district court’s filing 
fee at that time.31 The circuit court filing fee at that same time was $140.00. 
With the district courts’ unavailability, landlords started to file the actions in 
circuit court along with the $25.00 filing fee. In some counties, the clerks 
simply refused to file the actions. Other counties permitted filing, leading 
one judge to open a case with: ‘This is one of those $25.00 evictions.” 
Needless to say, neither the circuit court judges, nor the circuit court clerks, 
were pleased with the $115.00 difference.
The $25.00 filing fee provision was later replaced with one referencing 
that Ark. Code Ann. 16-17-705, the statutory provision for district court 
filing fees, governed the cost.32 Presently, the statute lists the district courts’ 
filing fees as $65.00 for civil actions, and $50.00 for small claims actions.33
The amended Act begs an interesting question: whether the action may be 
brought in small claims, where the parties cannot have counsel, or must it be 
brought in the civil division, where at least a corporation or an LLC would 
have to have counsel? In any case, tying the filing fee to the statute for dis-
trict court fees further underscores that the amendments intended to elimi-
nate circuit court jurisdiction over initial filings. Lacking any grant of juris-
diction, the Act’s eviction remedy became a nullity.
Another question is why the supreme court hasn't granted the district 
courts jurisdiction to hear these actions. Perhaps the answer lies in exploring 
the competing considerations at play within summary possession actions. At 
common law, the remedy for removing a non-paying tenant was ejectment. 
30. As part of its study of landlord-tenant laws in Arkansas, the Non-Legislative Com-
mission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws authorized by a 2011 act of the General As-
sembly tried to find if any district courts were being referred detainer actions. The Commis-
sion could find no incidents of any such referrals.
31. See Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, § 1, 2007 Ark. 
Acts 5110 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-902 (Supp. 2007).
32. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-902(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
33. See id. § 16-17-705.
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A major disadvantage was that ejectment actions took a lot of time to bring 
to judgment. Removal of the tenant prolonged the process even further.  
If the action was based upon continuing non-payment, the landlord 
would be at a loss of a significant amount of money over an extended period 
of time. Further, any judgment for the unpaid rent would probably be uncol-
lectible; a tenant who is unable to pay his or her own rent is highly likely to 
be judgment-proof.  On the other hand, a tenant with legitimate claims 
against his or her landlord is entitled to a full and complete hearing under 
the most basic concepts of due process.  
Constitutional precedent mandates the highest protection of the indi-
vidual’s homestead. To deal with these concerns, jurisdictions have devel-
oped various summary proceedings for expedited possession hearings. 
Damages for either party are the subject of a later hearing either in the same 
or a separate action. The damage hearing is held after the parties have had a 
full opportunity to plead the matter (including any tenant counter claims), to 
engage in discovery, and to have the matter tried to a jury.  
The existing Arkansas forcible entry and detainer statute addresses all 
of the competing concerns.34 It goes a step further and provides that if the 
landlord prevails at the possession hearing, he or she must post a bond to 
cover any damage sustained by the tenant if the court finds that possession 
should not have been granted.35 Additionally, the tenant has the option of 
posting a bond, which protects the landlord while allowing the tenant to 
remain in possession. As written, the statute protects the rent payment’s 
security for the landlord and it protects the due process rights for the tenant.
The remedy under the Act only addresses the landlord’s concern for 
expedited relief. It is totally vague as to what happens when a tenant appears 
and contests the action. Under the Act if the tenant appears to contest the 
action, “the court shall hear and determine the case as any other civil 
case.”36 What does that mean? If the case is heard on the return date of the 
order to show cause, that is not how any other civil case is determined. Is the 
case to be continued for the tenant to file an answer and counterclaim and 
engage in discovery? And to what does the tenant file an answer? The land-
lord began the action by filing an affidavit. How long does the tenant have 
to respond?  
The order from the court under the provisions of the Act provides for 
the tenant to show cause within ten days why a writ of possession should not 
issue. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant has thirty days to 
respond.37 Similarly, if the tenant files a counterclaim, what is the time for 
34. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-60-301 to -312 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2011).
35. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-60-307(d)(1)(B)(i).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-905 (Supp. 2013).
37. ARK. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1).
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the landlord to respond? Normally it would be another thirty days.38 What 
about discovery, both with respect to the nature and the timing? The su-
preme court promulgates the Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly, the court 
must have concerns granting jurisdiction to district courts to hear actions so 
at odds with those very rules.
Similarly, the supreme court is the final arbiter of questions of due pro-
cess. At its most basic level, due process (as mandated by the Arkansas and 
the United States Constitutions) requires the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time, and in a meaningful manner. The Act is vague as to how 
matters are to proceed in a contested case, which makes it almost impossible 
to assess whether the due process standards have been met.  
Certainly if the matter is to be heard at the point the tenant appears in 
response to the order to show cause, due process is not met. The tenant has 
been given no chance to file any counterclaims, has not been given an op-
portunity to conduct discovery, and is limited as to the nature of the claims 
against him or her by the detail or lack of detail in the affidavit of the land-
lord. 
Section 18-17-706(3)(B)(ii) of the Arkansas Code provides that if the 
tenant has not paid to the landlord rent allegedly due or cannot produce a 
receipt for such rent, a writ of possession will issue.39 Not all landlords give 
receipts. Receipts can also be lost. There may not be a receipt because there 
was an agreement between the landlord and the tenant to make repairs in-
stead of rent. The tenant may not have paid all or part of the rent because of 
an inordinately high water bill caused by the landlord’s failing to repair a 
water leak in the water line to the premises. The tenant may not have paid 
all or part of the rent because the tenant paid the bill for utility services that 
were to be provided by the landlord under the terms of the lease. The tenant 
may have legitimate questions as to whom the rent should be paid after re-
ceiving notice that the property is in foreclosure or after getting notice from 
a party claiming to have purchased the property in a tax or foreclosure sale. 
For all these reasons and more a tenant might not pay the rent but would not 
have the opportunity to assert his or her reason prior to possession under the 
statute—that is, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner as dictated 
by due process. 
The problem is not cured by the provision that a judgment will issue 
against the landlord if the tenant can show at a final hearing that the rent was 
not due.40 That provision assumes the landlord is good for the judgment. 
However, a landlord who cannot afford to pay for basic services or repairs 
or who is subject to foreclosure, may very well be judgment-proof. All these 
38. Id.
39. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 18-17-706(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2013).
40. See id. § 18-17-706(4)(B).
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due process considerations are concerns for the supreme court in granting 
jurisdiction to district courts to hear the remedy under the Act. 
II. WHAT WAS NOT ADDRESSED
The 2009 amendments to the Act were essentially corrective rather 
than substantive. The change to the service provision was obviously necessi-
tated by a clear mistake in drafting. Changing the language from an outright 
grant of jurisdiction to the district court to a provision that a district court 
having jurisdiction could hear the new remedy was a recognition that the 
Act as written exceeded the power of the Legislature. Finally, the elimina-
tion of initial jurisdiction in circuit court is to some degree a correction in 
that the Act ignored the established circuit court filing fee and provided for 
an action to be filed in circuit court for the bargain-basement price of twen-
ty-five dollars. 
Given that circuit court jurisdiction was eliminated at the same time the 
lack of district court jurisdiction was recognized in the statute, the amend-
ments had the substantive effect of indirectly repealing the remedy under the 
Act. Had the Legislature wished to retain the remedy, it could have resolved 
the problem by providing the same fee to file in circuit court as any other 
circuit action.
The amendments made no effort to address the 2008 article’s many 
substantive criticisms of the statute. The article pointed out that there were a 
number of URLTA sections that were deleted for no apparent reason, other 
than that they might be of value to a tenant.41 By way of example, one of the 
early sections of URLTA provides that a court may refuse to enforce any 
rental agreement, or section of a rental agreement, that was unconscionable 
when made. It also provides that a court may enforce the agreement without 
the unconscionable provision, or it may limit the unconscionable provision 
to avoid an unconscionable result.42
And further, if unconscionability is raised as an issue, the provision in-
dicates that the parties shall have the opportunity to present evidence as to 
the setting, purpose, and effect of the agreement or provision to assist the 
court in its determination.43 The unconscionability language in URLTA is 
not controversial. It mirrors almost word for word the language in the Ar-
kansas version of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with the sale and 
lease of goods.44 Additionally, the unconscionability defense is a widely 
recognized principle of contract law; both in Arkansas and nationally. In-
41. Prettyman, supra note 1, at 72.
42. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.303(a)(1) (1974).
43. See id. § 1.303(b).
44. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-302 (Repl. 2001); id. § 4-2A-108(1), (3) (Repl. 2001).
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deed, there is room to argue that unconscionable lease provisions should not 
be enforced under general contract law. What is the justification for not 
making that clear as provided in URLTA?   
Other deleted provisions of URLTA bear on the unconscionability is-
sue. Under URLTA, certain provisions are prohibited in lease agreements. 
These prohibited provisions include: 1) authorizing a person to confess 
judgment for the tenant, 2) paying the landlord’s attorney’s fees in all cases, 
and 3) agreeing to waive the landlord’s liability under other laws.45 Such 
provisions are clearly unconscionable. The tenant would be giving up any 
right to challenge the actions of the landlord and would be agreeing to pay 
the landlord’s attorney’s fees even if he or she won. Significantly, the same 
provisions are prohibited in the federal regulations governing all federally 
assisted housing. While it is unlikely that a court would enforce such a pro-
vision, once again, what is the justification for taking it out of the Act?
In a similar vein, the Act eliminated URLTA provisions that dealt with 
rules and regulations.46 Increasingly, landlords are presenting tenants with 
sets of multipage rules and regulations, in addition to multipage leases. 
Somewhere in these dense agreements, there will be a provision that the 
tenant is also bound by the landlord’s rules and regulations, which thereby 
incorporates them into the lease. 
URLTA attempts to define a proper purpose for a rule or regulation, 
and provides that it must be for the purpose of promoting the convenience, 
safety, or welfare of the tenant; preserving the landlord’s property from 
abuse; or making a fair distribution of services and facilities for all the ten-
ants.47 In addition, the rule or regulation must be reasonably related to the 
purpose for which it was adopted, must be applied fairly to all of the tenants, 
must be explicit enough for the tenant to understand what may or may not 
be done, and must not be for the purpose of evading any obligation of the 
landlord.48
URLTA also provides that the rule or regulation must be presented to 
the tenant at the beginning of the tenancy or when the rule or regulation is 
adopted.49 If it is not presented to the tenant at the beginning of the tenancy, 
and the rule or regulation significantly modifies the lease, the tenant must 
agree to the rule or regulation in writing in order for it to be enforceable.50
Typically, an individual who is looking to rent residential housing needs 
something quickly. They are not likely to be in a position to carefully read 
45. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.403 (1974).
46. See id. § 3.102
47. See id. § 3.102(a)(1)
48. See id. §§ 3.102(a)(2), (3), (4) and (5).
49. See id. § 3.102(a)(6).
50. See id. § 3.102(b).
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and understand all of the provisions in a multipage lease and it’s incorpo-
rated multipage rules and regulations.
The average tenant’s main concern is how much the rent will be and 
how quickly he or she will be able to move in. Allowing landlords unfet-
tered latitude to impose rules and regulations provides them with unmerited 
power over tenants, especially if they may do so at will. URLTA’s limita-
tions on that power are not unreasonable. There is no justification for com-
pletely rejecting them. While it is true that a rule or regulation, especially 
one changing the terms of the lease, might very well run afoul of general 
contact law on unconscionability, why not make it clear what the bounds of 
a proper rule or regulation should be?
The landlord’s access to the premises was greatly expanded by 
URLTA. But URLTA also provided the tenant with counterbalance protec-
tion against the abuse of those rights of access.51 The Act, however, further 
expanded the landlord’s rights to access. It then deleted all of the protections 
that had been provided for the tenant.52
At common law, a landlord had no right to come onto the premises
without the tenant’s permission.53 Tenancies were the subject of property 
law, and not contract law. A landlord transferred a property right (exclusive 
use) to the tenant upon entering into the tenancy. As a direct result, most 
modern leases contain a provision allowing the landlord access to make re-
pairs, access to show the property during the last month of a tenancy, and 
access to enter in an emergency.  Typically, with the exception of emergent 
situations, the provisions limit the landlord’s access by requiring that the 
tenant be provided with reasonable notice, as well as requiring that entry be 
at reasonable times of the day.  
URLTA recognized that landlords needed access to the premises in cer-
tain situations and that the leases typically provided them with such access. 
For that reason, URLTA limits tenants from unreasonably withholding per-
mission for the landlord to enter. Under the URLTA, landlords may enter to 
inspect the premises; to make necessary repairs, alterations, or improve-
ments; to supply necessary or agreed upon services; or to show the premises 
to prospective purchasers, tenants, mortgagees, workmen, or contractors.54 It 
requires the landlord to give the tenant two days notice, and it limits entry to 
reasonable times unless an emergency exists.55
51. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 3.103, (1974).
52. See ARK. CODE ANN. §18-17-602 (Supp. 2011).
53. See Watson v. Calvin, 69 Ark. App. 109, 113, 9 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2000) (citing 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 308 (1968); 49 AM.JUR.2d Landlord and Ten-
ant § 1 (2d ed.1995).
54. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 3.103(a) (1974).
55. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 3.103(c) (1974).
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These protections were eliminated from the Act. The Act also eliminat-
ed the tenant’s right to injunctive relief upon a violation by the landlord. Not 
surprisingly, the Act simultaneously retained the landlord’s right of injunc-
tive relief, despite the fact that URLTA provides this mode of relief bilater-
ally.56 Ironically, the heading of the section dealing with the right to injunc-
tive relief reads, “landlord and tenant remedies for abuse of access.” The 
body of this section only contains a remedy for the landlord.57
The overt failure to restore the above deleted provisions of URLTA 
clearly demonstrates the mean spirited and one-sided nature of the Act. 
There is nothing controversial about the deleted provisions; except that they 
are basic protections afforded to tenants.58 Along the same lines, URLTA 
has an extensive section dealing with tenants rights. It is deleted from the 
Act.  Do tenants have any rights in Arkansas? Is Arkansas’s landlord-tenant 
law really just for the protection of the landlord? It would appear so, as the 
Legislature flagrantly ignored the Act’s glaring omissions during the 2009 
amendments.
More disturbing still, the Act supplemented the landlord access provi-
sions, effectively giving landlords unlimited access to the tenants' premises. 
Essentially, with no consideration or justification, Arkansas leapt from the 
common-law position of no access to one with unlimited and unchecked 
rights of access for landlords. The Act added provisions that are not found in 
URLTA. These provisions allow the landlord entry to “investigate possible 
rule or lease violations” or to " investigate possible criminal activity.”59 It 
appears that this radical change was put into effect with little discussion or 
thought. The Act quickly sailed through the Legislature—without controver-
sy—when originally enacted and, the access provisions were not even con-
sidered in the 2009 amendments.
URLTA’s provisions for landlord access have clearly specified purpos-
es that are objectively evaluable. The landlord’s need to repair, alter, or im-
prove the premises either exists, or it does not. Similarly, the exterminator or 
service provider is either scheduled for an appointment, or is not. A prospec-
tive buyer or tenant wishing to inspect the premises either exists, or does 
not. Whereas, investigations of lease violations or criminal activity appear to 
be completely subjective, or at least no objective basis is contained in the 
Act. Indeed, it is just the opposite as the standard is “possible.”60 As is often 
argued in court, anything is possible. Does this mean any access is justifia-
ble under the Act? If it is not, under what circumstances and when is access 
56. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.302 (1974).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. §18-17-705.
58. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.101–4.107.
59. ARK. CODE ANN. §18-17-602
60. Id.
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by the landlord not justified?  And more importantly, how does the tenant 
prevent the landlord’s access without the Act providing remedies for protec-
tion? Given that the Act chose to omit the unconscionability and rules-and-
regulations provisions, the opportunity for “possible” violations to investi-
gate is totally unchecked.
The provision allowing landlord access to investigate possible criminal 
activity is even more troublesome. There is an extensive body of law gov-
erning the right of law enforcement officials to enter into, and inspect, prem-
ises for suspected criminal activity. There is a requirement of probable 
cause, not merely possible criminal activity, and there are typically limits on 
the extent and nature of the search. No such safeguards against the landlord 
exist in the Act.
In essence, a landlord can impulsively enter the premises and invade 
the tenant’s privacy. On a mere whim, or with an ulterior motive, the land-
lord could look through every bag, box, or package in the tenant’s premises, 
hoping to find evidence of possible criminal activity. What limits the scope 
of the investigation? Is he allowed to root through all of the tenant’s person-
al possessions at will? In stark opposition to limitations (such as the warrant 
requirement) for law enforcement personnel, the Act places no limits on a 
landlord’s search of the premises.
Allowing the landlord to investigate possible criminal activity creates a 
“Devil’s Triangle” of law enforcement, landlord, and tenant that raises all 
sorts of policy and constitutional questions. The basic question is whether 
landlords, with no experience in law enforcement, should be investigating in
the first place? This is increasingly pertinent given the many ways that the 
landlord and tenant’s interests may be at odds with each other. The tenant 
may have rejected the landlord’s sexual advances. The landlord may want 
the premises for himself, or for a family member. The tenant may have 
made legitimate complaints about the conditions of the premises to the land-
lord or code enforcement. The tenant may have testified for another tenant 
in an action against the landlord, or may have brought his or her own action 
against the landlord. Inserting the criminal process into the landlord-tenant 
relationship does not assist any of the triangle’s parties.
One troubling scenario is when the landlord initiates the entry of the 
premises and subsequently involves law enforcement. How reliable is evi-
dence that is discovered by a landlord? What can be done with it?  If the 
landlord enters and finds illegal drugs, can they be turned over to law en-
forcement in order to prosecute the tenant? Who is to say that the drugs 
came from the tenant and not the landlord, especially if the two were already 
at odds? Even more troubling are cases that involve items that, unlike illicit 
street drugs, are not in-and-of-themselves illegal to possess. If the landlord 
enters and discovers syringes, is the tenant using illegal drugs or merely a 
diabetic? If the tenant appears to be living beyond her means, is she engaged 
in some criminal enterprise or just racking up credit-card debt? If the tenant 
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is truly not engaging in criminal activity, the explanation will often require 
the tenant to provide sensitive personal-health or financial information to the 
landlord, which the landlord has no legitimate reason to obtain.  
A second equally troubling scenario is one where law enforcement in-
stigates the entry—either through encouraging the landlord to enter or 
through obtaining the landlord’s consent to enter the premises. The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforce-
ment.61 There is a whole body of law that governs whether a search is prop-
er, and what to do with evidence obtained through an improper search. In 
Breshears v. State,62 the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a drug convic-
tion where the drugs were discovered after the tenant had refused entry, but 
the landlord consented to the search. The court found that the search violat-
ed the tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Does the Act reverse Breshears
and abrogate Fourth Amendment rights for tenants? Are only home owners 
exempt from unreasonable searches of their living space? If not, are land-
lords given the same restrictions and limitations for criminal searches as law 
enforcement? And finally, if landlords are given such restrictions, are the 
cities and their law enforcement officials liable for federal civil rights viola-
tions by landlords?
Finally, even if the landlord does not involve law enforcement, but 
chooses instead to confront the tenant, is this really something that should be 
encouraged by statute? If the tenant is truly guilty of a crime, a confronta-
tion would be counterproductive; at best it gives the tenant a chance to con-
ceal the evidence, and at worst it could be lethally dangerous, especially in 
cases where drugs are involved. The Act’s unnecessary confusion of the 
roles of the landlord and law enforcement creates more problems than it 
solves, and it raises more questions than it answers.  This is not to say land-
lords should ignore illegal activity on their premises. If a landlord has a val-
id suspicion of illegal activity, the proper course of action is to do what 
landlords have done for the last century and a half: notify law enforcement 
so that any criminal investigation can be handled by the professionals.  
Last but very far from least, the amendments did not address the issue 
of habitability. Arkansas retains the unique distinction of being the only 
state that does not recognize a landlord’s duty to maintain residential prem-
ises at minimally livable standards. In 2006, as part of adopting URLTA, 
Alabama joined every other state (save Arkansas) in recognizing an implied 
warranty of habitability.63 All of URLTA’s sections dealing with habitability 
were deleted from the Act. Those deletions were made in spite of three sepa-
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
62. Breshears v. State, 94 Ark. App. 192, 228 S.W.3d 508 (2006).
63. See ALA. CODE. § 35-9A-204; UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.104 
(1974).
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rate articles advocating for such a warranty and the abandonment of the doc-
trine of caveat lessee.64 In two Arkansas Supreme Court cases, the court 
plainly asked the Legislature to act.65 Indeed, in Thomas v. Stewart, Justice 
Brown, in his concurrence, warned that the Legislature’s failure to act might 
cause the Court to do so.66 Despite this warning, Arkansas is still without 
any protection for tenants from slumlords.
The concept of caveat lessee, or renter beware, is a relic of old com-
mon law and a time when tenants were typically farmers. Back then, the 
land was the primary consideration in a rental agreement, not the buildings. 
The tenant was responsible for the maintenance of any buildings on the land 
because they were related to his use of the property for farming. Modern 
residential tenants are primarily interested in the building and the shelter it 
provides. This fundamental change was recognized in the 1970 case of 
Javins v. First National Realty Corporation:
Today’s urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live in multiple dwell-
ing houses, are interested, not in the land, but solely in “a house suitable 
for occupation.”  Furthermore, today’s city dweller usually has a single, 
specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work; he is unable to make re-
pairs like the “jack-of-all-trades” farmer who was the common law’s 
model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian predecessor who often 
remained on one piece of land for his entire life, urban tenants today are 
more mobile than ever before.  A tenant’s tenure in a specific apartment 
will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs.  In addition, the 
increasing complexity of today’s dwellings renders them much more dif-
ficult to repair than the structures of earlier times.   In a multiple dwell-
ing repair may require access to equipment and areas in the control of the 
landlord.  Low and middle income tenants, even if they were interested 
in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for major re-
pairs since they have no long-term interest in the property.67
What was true in 1970 remains true in 2013. Indeed, part and parcel of 
Arkansas’s Act was the repeal and replacement of sections of landlord-
tenant law that were archaic. And in fact, Arkansas’s Act repealed a number 
64. See generally Jeremy K. Brown, A Landlord's Duty to Mitigate in Arkansas: What it 
was, What it is and What it Should be, 55 ARK. L. REV. 123 (2002); Kathryn Hake, Is Home 
Where Arkansas's Heart is?: State Adopts Unique Statutory Approach to Landlord Tort Lia-
bility and Maintains Common Law “Caveat Lessee", 59 ARK. L. REV. 737 (2006); Ashley E. 
Norman, A Tenant's Dilemma: The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 859 (2009).
65. Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 626, 932 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1996); Thomas v. 
Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 41, 60 S.W. 3d 415, 420 (2001).
66. Thomas, 347 Ark. At 41, 60 S.W.3d at 421.
67. Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078–79 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of antiquated provisions of the then-existing landlord-tenant law.68 However, 
the stated goal of the Act, "to simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the 
law governing rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of 
landlords and tenants”69 seems to have been lost, at least as far as the war-
ranty of habitability is concerned.  
Ironically the Arkansas Supreme Court has, for a number of years, rec-
ognized an implied warranty of habitability with respect to new-home 
sales.70 Sellers are liable to buyers for defects in the home. With respect to 
the sale of homes, there is an entire industry devoted to inspecting homes to 
discover defects for potential buyers. Many buyers will seek the service of a 
professional inspector before purchasing a home. This is not regularly the 
case for a tenant. 
In almost all cases, tenants will not have the means to purchase an in-
spection. Similarly, tenants likely do not have the expertise necessary to do 
such an inspection on their own.  Landlords, on the other hand, will general-
ly know about—or at least should be charged with knowledge of—any de-
fects in their property. As such, a purchaser who buys defective real proper-
ty is protected under Arkansas law, but a tenant rents at his peril. No liabil-
ity is imposed upon a landlord who is aware of defective conditions.
An argument defending Arkansas’s lack of a warranty of habitability is 
that Arkansas has the lowest average rent of any state. The fallacy of this 
argument is that it rests upon the presumption that Arkansas’s highly pro-
landlord laws are to thank for the low rent. It ignores the fact that housing 
costs in Arkansas are lower than many parts of the country, as are property 
taxes; the two costs are directly reflected in rental rates. A landlord wishing 
to make a profit must charge enough to cover his mortgage and taxes, 
among other expenses. Additionally, because of the lower housing costs, 
many middle and even lower middle class individuals will buy rather than 
rent. 
Further, Arkansas does not have the kind of great urban center that will 
attract large numbers of upper middle class and upper class tenants who will 
rent luxury apartments. There is no New York City, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco, or Chicago equivalent in Arkansas. The average tenant in Arkansas is 
poor, or a student, and will be renting the more modest apartments. When 
compared to states with similar circumstances but with a warranty of habita-
bility, there is no appreciable difference in the average rent prices.71
68. The Act repealed ten sections of chapter 16 of Title 18, the chapter titled 
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-102(a)(1).
70. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1096, 449 S.W.2d 922, 924 (1970).
71. Arkansas's fair market rent of $593 is not appreciably lower than West Virginia at 
$598, South Dakota at $599, Kentucky at $616 and Mississippi at $622, and all those states 
have a warranty of habitability.
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The absence of a warranty of habitability encourages bad landlords at 
the expense of good ones. A landlord who fails to make necessary repairs 
will either charge less rent or make a larger profit charging similar rent. If 
all landlords are held to the same standard, there is no competitive ad-
vantage. More importantly, society as a whole will benefit. Housing stock 
will remain more stable with the imposition of minimum standards. Poor 
tenants and their children will not have to live in substandard and potentially 
dangerous housing. A well written habitability statute prevents tenants from 
coming up with excuses to avoid paying rent. Any such statute should pro-
vide a requirement for notice of defects to the landlord, and provide the 
landlord with a reasonable time to make repairs. Rent payments can be made 
to the court or in an escrow account to protect landlords while repairs are 
being done. Needless to say, defects cannot be the result of abuse to the 
property by the tenant or the tenant’s guests. A proper habitability statute 
provides a realistic balance between the needs of the tenant, society, and the 
landlord.
III. CONCLUSION
In 2011, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted a statute creating the 
Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws.72
While the Commission members were evenly split between those favoring 
landlords, and those favoring tenants, the Commission report unanimously 
recommended nearly all of the matters that were not addressed in the Act’s 
2009 amendments. The Commission unanimously recommended the Act 
include the unconscionability provision,73 the section on prohibited provi-
sions,74 and URLTA’s access provisions.75 There was also a unanimous rec-
ommendation that the other deleted provisions of the model act be reviewed 
for applicability to Arkansas.76 The Commission report, with respect to the 
additional provisions, indicates that there was simply insufficient time to 
review all the deleted provisions.77 Most importantly, the Commission rec-
ommended Arkansas join the rest of the nation in providing a warranty of 
habitability.78
72. 2011 Ark. Acts 1198.
73. Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws: Report to Gov-
ernor Mike Beebe, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Speaker of the House, 5 (De-
cember 31, 2012), http://ualr.edu/lawreview/files/2013/01/Foster_Commission-Report.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6. 
77. Id. at 24. 
78. Id. at 4–5.
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Once again, the recommendation was unanimous. As written, the war-
ranty of habitability recommendation strikes a balance between the need to 
make necessary repairs and the landlord’s need for protection from abusive 
tenants. While the recommendation provides a number of conditions subject 
to redress under the warranty, it also provides that the landlord must be giv-
en a reasonable time to make repairs, that the tenant must not be in default 
of rent payments, and that the landlord has no duty to make repairs which 
are caused by the tenant or the tenants’ guests. The work of the Commission 
illustrates the balanced approach that comes when both sides of an issue are 
fairly and equally represented. Unfortunately, in the past that has not been 
the case in our Legislature, as evidenced by the totally one-sided 2007 Act. 
Hopefully, the Legislature will act on the recommendations of the Commis-
sion, and it can be said in the future that Arkansas has "landlord-tenant law" 
instead of "landlord protection law."             
